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Soccer violence and attendance in Italy: Some empirical 








This paper aims at investigating the impact on Italian Serie A attendance of the urgent 
antiviolence measures adopted by the Italian government in 2007 (decree n.8 of 8
th 
February 2007, successively converted by law 4
th April 2007). These urgent measures 
were forced by the public opinion after the death of the agent Filippo Raciti (2
nd February 
2007) during clashes before the Sicilian derby between Catania and Palermo. The purpose 
was to force back the overexcited committed  fans and attract the uncommitted part 
previously deterred by soccer violence. Using data on match attendance during the 
championships 2008/09 and 2009/10, when the fidelity fan card was introduced and 
admittance restrictions adopted, the paper tests if the expected substitution effect between 
committed and uncommitted fans was effective. Results show that the different measures 
adopted by Comitato per la Sicurezza delle Manifestazioni Sportive (CASMS) and by the 
Osservatorio Nazionale delle Manifestazioni Sportive (ONMS) reduced the stadium 
attendance from a minimum of 1.600 to a maximum of 1.900 tickets sold. From this 
perspective the fidelity fan card can not be considered a successful measure (it has not 
been able to invert the negative trend of stadium attendance in Serie A of the last three 
decades.  
 
                                                 
 Researcher in Economics, Faculty of Political Sciences - University of Teramo; e-mail address 
mdidomizio@unite.it. I’m grateful to Raul Caruso and Giovanni Piersanti for helpful comments and 
suggestions.   4
Introduction 
 
The season 2011/12 of the Italian football top league Serie A is the second in which the 
fidelity fan card is operating. This card was introduced by the Ministry of the Interior as 
part of an «antiviolence» package aiming at reducing one of the most relevant critics of 
the Italian football: crimes and violence before, during and after matches.
1 These 
measures, adopted by Decree n.8 of 8
th February 2007, successively converted by Law 41 
of 4
th April 2007, were forced by the public opinion after the death of the agent Filippo 
Raciti (2
nd February 2007) during clashes before the Sicilian derby between Catania and 
Palermo. The opportunity and the effectiveness of this package has been long debated 
from different points of view: jurisdictional, political and sporting.
2 The fidelity fan card 
was introduced in order to create a new, direct and deep connection between the club and 
its fans by according, to the card subscribers, some access facilities to the stadium, and 
excluding them from public order restrictions imposed by safety committees. According to 
the majority of organized fans and to other part of public opinion, in the time the card has 
lost those fidelity peculiarities becoming a sort of business card (Bianchi, 2010). 
The paper tries to investigate how the antiviolence strategy adopted by the Italian 
government influenced the attendance in Serie A from August 2008 up to May 2010. As 
known and long debated in Italy, the antiviolence measures adopted by the Minister of the 
Interior, Roberto Maroni (by forcing the adoption of the fidelity fan card so as to preclude, 
in some circumstances, the stadium admittance to that part of fans not equipped with) 
would have selected that part of proper fans from their violent counterpart. This. In the 
period under investigation, the Ministry of the Interior delegated the Osservatorio 
Nazionale sulle Manifestazioni Sportive (ONMS) – a national board monitoring the public 
security risk of sporting events – to signal the matches under risk. Taking into account the 
ONMS signals, the Comitato di Analisi per la Sicurezza delle Manifestazioni Sportive 
(CASMS) – a committee with an executive power on public security prescriptions on 
sporting events – would have had to decide the degree of restrictions to stadium 
admittance. Under such restrictions the owners of the fidelity fan card, being excluded by 
                                                 
1 The legislation on prevention and punishment of soccer violence episodes was introduced by Law 401 of 
the 13
th December 1989 that ratified various interventions of European authorities after the tragedy of 
Heysel stadium in Brussell on May 1985. 
2 For an exhaustive survey on the jurisdictional debate about the rules introduced by Law 41/2007 see 
GARRAFFA (2010a, 2010b, 2011).   5
the entry limiting measures, would have had a preferential lane with respect to the other 
fans. The rational was to compensate the removal of visiting team fans not cardholder with 
other categories previously deterred because of the potential violence: child, women and 
families. In other words the main target was to modify the fans committed attitude with an 
uncommitted one, using an inspired guess of Szymanski (2003). 
The paper aims at investigating, using proper econometric tools, if the substitution effect 
on the attendance dominated the deterred one on visiting team fans admittance. The paper 
is organized as follows: the first section discusses the different theoretical approaches for 
analysing the phenomenon of violence in the sporting environment and particularly of 
soccer violence. The second section frames the soccer violence phenomenon in the 
historical and social Italian context. The third section illustrates the data and econometric 
tools managed for the empirical investigation. The fourth section presents and discusses 
the estimation results. The fifth section concludes. 
 
 
1. Violence in sports: the different approaches 
 
The presence of violence in sporting context is considered almost endemic, as a natural 
consequence of the frustration generated by a defeat (Bandura, 1973). In football contests 
other factors act open the soccer scenes to the development of violent episodes: football is 
a team sport, it is associated to a community sense of belonging and depicts a conflict; 
using the sentence in Elias and Dunning (1989) the football match stylizes and 
miniaturizes the war. The violence in sporting contexts can not be considered a modern 
phenomenon. As mentioned in Serra and Pili (2003) in the 1314 the major of London was 
enforced to forbid the hurling over country - a game played by the surrounding villages in 
which a ball made by clothes had to be carried to the opposite village - because of 
disorders associated. The violence did not decline after the codification of rules in the 
English professional football in the XIX
th century; this first attempt of a modern 
organization was followed by the diffusion of the moral panic through the football 
environment because of the transmission of violent attitudes of the working class, the hard 
core of football supporters.    6
The forms of soccer violence evolves, particularly in England, till to assume the form of 
the hooliganism that, after the tragedies at Heysel and Hillsbourough Stadiums, in May 
1985 and April 1989 respectively, caused the exclusion of English teams from continental 
cups up to 1991.
3 The connection between sport and violence is not exclusive of European 
society. Recent studies on American College Football focused on the relationship between 
crimes and sporting events (Rees and Schnepel, 2009), emphasizes the unprofitability of 
hosting a sport event in the own community because of high costs associated to the 
prevention and control of violent situations. 
The relationship between criminal attitudes and sport has been also analysed in 
terms of positive externalities generated by sport practice, both on social relations among 
practisers and on economic growth (Caruso, 2011). The sport practice should act not only 
as a deterrent factor with respect to the diffusion of micro-criminal episodes, but also on 
labour productivity improvement through a positive impact of the sport practice on the 
not-cognitive ability of workers; according to Caruso (2009) this impacts positively on the 
growth performance of the whole economy. 
Turning on football, the soccer violence has been lengthily debated as well as 
countered. Several approaches have been used to analyse the phenomenon: they range 
passed from the psychiatric studies of Harrington (1968), who considered this crime 
attitude a pathological diseases to treat, to the sociological researches firstly developed by 
Taylor (1969). According to Taylor the key factor explaining the soccer violence should 
be found in the social position of practising, inside and outside the stadium, together with 
the effort of the working class to hold out the trend of the soccer towards a middle-class 
outlook. From this perspective the aim of the people involved in violent episodes was to 
show their opposition against the tendency of soccer to loose its recreational prerogative in 
favour of a business-oriented one. These approaches have been later refined to take into 
account the new forms of the soccer violence and people involved in it. While, at first, the 
violence pointed toward referees, players and managers of the opponent teams, 
successively those vandalism aimed at the opponent team fans. Other studies focuses on 
the relationships between fans and mass media, because great influences on hooliganism 
attitude could be attributed to the ability of TV, radio and newspapers to amplify the 
presumed «political message» of the violent minority, or simply to appear (Dal Lago, 
                                                 
3 For a complete report about the above mentioned tragic events see LORD J. TAYLOR, The Hillsborough 
Stadium Disaster – The Final Report, HMSO, London, 1990.   7
1990). Last but not least, the soccer violence has been studied in the light of the 
connection between hooliganism and political extremism, often of racist nature, that 
diffused particularly in the first 70’s, firstly in England and then in other countries 
including Italy.  
 
 
2. Soccer violence in Italy: an historical synthesis  
 
As in other European countries, soccer violence in Italy is not a recent phenomenon 
(Ghirelli, 1990). The first «official» punch-up reported by newspapers occurred between 
fans of Genoa F.C. and Internazionale at the first Federal Tournament, played on the 8
th 
May 1898. A more serious episode happened in Turin, on the 5
th July 1925, after the 
match between Bologna and Genoa: at the trains station «Porta Nuova» several gun shots 
were fired from the carriages occupied by the fans of the two opponent teams causing only 
minor injuries among the passengers fortunately (Roversi, 1992). The cruel stories 
associated to football matches filled hundreds and hundreds pages of newspapers over 
time, but in the 70’s the soccer violence changed its profile (Tavella, 2006). The brutal 
episodes inside and outside the stadium increased their gravity and, at the same time, the 
violent minority tried to organize the team support in a standardized way creating, for each 
team, the «Ultras» movements. On 28
th October 1979, the murder of Vincenzo Paparelli – 
a supporter of Lazio – hit by a rocket shoot from the Romanist curve during the roman 
derby between Roma and Lazio, shook the public opinion consciences, but no serious 
measures were implemented to control the violent drift, particularly confined inside the 
stadium. In the 80’s and 90’s soccer violence didn’t reduce its intensity, forcing the 
government to promulgate the first special laws in the 1989, successively implemented by 
other interventions. 
In the new century the soccer violence assumed the shape of «anti-system actions» where 
the violent groups, supporting different teams, joined each others against the policemen, 
the preferred target of the ultras with deeds similar to terroristic actions (Porro, 2008). As 
mentioned by Serra and Pili (2003, p.77) «curves can be considered the mirror of the 
Country» where we can find a mix of social diseases and political inclinations without 
legacy with football environment, but strongly perceived from a social point of view.
 On   8
this perspective the xenophobe tendency of many supporters should be the evidence and 
the consequence of the sneaky intolerance belonging to large part of Italian society not 
able to «absorb the strong presence of coloured and non-EU citizens that other nations 
have already faced and solved» (Serra and Pili, 2003, p.78). Following Guttmann (1986), 
Porro noticed that both spectators and athletes involved in violent episodes inside a «the 
social subsystem represented by sport competition» could not develop this tendencies 




3. Effect of antiviolence measures on attendance 
 
In this section we present the econometric tools used to analyze the impact of the 
antiviolence measures, set by Italian authorities in the recent years, on attendance in the 
Italian soccer top league. Particular attention is devoted to the CASMS dispositions during 
the  Serie A tournaments in 2008/09 and 2009/10.
4 From an operative perspective the 
ONMS, composed of several authorities representing the sporting, public order, political 
and transports environment, signals to the CASMS the potential public order threat and 
risk profile of the matches. The CASMS evaluates the ONMS indications and adopts a 
number of measures about the opportunity of live participation to the risky event. The 
measures could be i) the prohibition of selling more than one ticket per person for the 
visiting team fans stadium area for events with a low risk profile; ii) the prohibition of 
selling game tickets in the province or region of the visiting team for matches with a 
medium risk profile, iii) the no entry injunction in the visiting team fans stadium area for 
matches with an high risk profile.
5 Together with these prescriptions the CASMS also 
suggests the adoption of the measures needed to facilitate the live fruition of the events for 
those categories previously discouraged and worried about violence, such as families and 
women. 
                                                 
4 Data on season 2010/11 have been excluded from our range since, starting from this season, the fidelity fan 
card became compulsory for visiting team fans. 
5 From these measures the fidelity fan card subscribers are excluded.   9
Our analysis points to evaluate how the CASMS interventions have influenced the 
attendance during the Serie A seasons 2008/09 and 2009/2010, trying to isolate the 
variables that, together with the CASMS decisions, influenced the stadium attendance.  
The panel data set includes the 420 matches played in the two seasons under investigation 
among the 15 teams that participated to the Serie A from season 2007/08 up to season 
2009/10.
6 Some missing data reduced the set into 391 observations in 196 cross section 
unities.
7 The collection in a data panel set rather than in single cross section unities or in 
time series gave us the opportunity to observe the matches features repeated in time in 
order to isolate the prominent factors influencing the attendance, particularly those related 
to the measures disposed by the CASMS. 




-  the natural logarithm of the previous season average attendance of home team 
(Log_HATT1). 
-   The natural logarithm of the previous season average attendance of away team 
(Log_AATT1). 
-    The distance between the cities of teams involved in the match independent 
variable (TIME_DST). The distance is expressed in travelling time by car (in 
minutes) as reported in Michelin itineraries on website www.viamichelin.it 
(September 2011). 
-  The matches played between teams of the same city or of the same region 
(D_DERBY). The rational is that derbies are matches with strong appeal because of 
great rivalry among cities or fans and this attitude must be taken into account in the 
attendance estimation equation. 
-  Two dummy variables (D_TOP3_AW, D_WDAY) in order to capture the possible 
effects on attendance generated i) by the opportunity to be present at live 
performances of top teams (Juventus, Inter or Milan) in the own city, and ii) by the 
working day collocation of the matches. 
                                                 
6 Matches under investigation are those played among Atalanta, Cagliari, Catania, Fiorentina, Genoa, Inter, 
Juventus, Lazio, Milan, Napoli, Palermo, Roma, Sampdoria, Siena and Udinese. 
7 Missing data refers to the home matches played by Cagliari; the club do not spread official data on single 
match attendance. 
8 Data on single match attendance are available at www.stadiapostcards.com in section «archivi» (September 
2011). 
9 For details about attendance estimation see Dobson and Goddard (2001).   10
-  A dummy variable (D_09/10) to capture possible potential trend in attendance. 
-  An index of widespread crime (WCI).
10 
-  Pro-capita gross domestic product (GDP_PC).
 11 
-  A dummy variable (D_CASMS) capturing the CASMS decisions.
12  
Table 1 describes the main characteristics of the observed variables, excluding dummies. 
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  






10,18 8,92  11,29 10,15 0,52 
Log_HATT1 





home team (H) 
and away team 
(A) in the 
previous season 




(minutes) by car 
among cities  
443,25 0 1107  337  313,56 
WCI 420 
Widespread crime 
index in the 
region of the 
home team 




in the province of 
the home team 
(Italy=100) 
108,31 62,4 151,9  109,9 26,67 
 
4. Estimation results 
 
Estimation results obtained using OLS with heteroskedasticity correction (HAC), GLS 
with random effect, and WLS are shown in table 2.  
                                                 
10 The WCI reports the number of thefts and less serious robberies per 1.000 residents in the home team 
region. Source: Istat; data are available at www.istat.it/it/files/2011/03/sicurezza.xls (October 2011). Special 
thanks are due to Raul Caruso for precious suggestions in this direction.  
11 Data are available at province level and are introduced as an index number placing at 100 the Italian 
average. Sources Istituto Tagliacarne and Unioncamere, www.starnet.unioncamere.it (October 2011). 
12 The dummy equals to 1 when the ONMS attributed a risky profile to the match under investigation and 
CASMS imposed some attendance restrictions as specified above.   11
 
Table 2: estimation results on data panel with 391 data included in 196 cross section unities. 
Dependent variable: Log_ATT 
Model  Pooled OLS (HAC)  Random Effect (GLS)  WLS: Weights based on error 
variance 



































































































































  0,002 
(0,002) 





  0,0002 
(0,0004) 




2 R  
0,886 0,888      0,988  0,989 
St. err. Res.  0,175 0,173 0,175  0,174  0,993  0,991 
F Stat  378,68*** 306,81***      3953,81***  3460,57*** 
Breusch-Pagan 
test 
   7,858***  8,513***     
Hausman test     63,38***  113,52***     
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis . statistical significance:***>99%, **>95%, *>90%. 
 
The coefficients are statistical significant and show the expected sign. The closeness of 
Log_HATT1 coefficient to one confirms that stadium spectators attitude is characterized 
by a strong habit persistence. The relevance of match quality and time collocation on 
attendance is confirmed by the significance of D_TOP3_AW, D_WDAY and D_DERBY, 
together with the travelling time distance between cities of teams involved in the match 
under investigation (TIME_DST). The statistical significance and negative sign of dummy 
D_09/10 indicate the presence of a negative trend on the attendance where intensity does 
not depend on the typology of the estimated equations; the impact of the trend can be   12
evaluated in terms of a reduction of 2.000 spectators for each single match investigated. 
The coefficients of variables associated to the crime widespread and to GDP (gross 
domestic product) are statistical significant only under the WLS model and both are 
positive. The positive impact of GDP_PC on attendance is easy to explain while more 
complex to read is the direct relationship with WCI. One could in fact expect that, being 
WCI a proxy for the violent context in which the match is played, high levels of WCI 
should be detrimental for the attendance. But this effect is just caught by the dummy 
D_CASMS,  since the ONMS decisions are driven also by general public order 
considerations and not only by sporting ones. From the estimated equations we see that the 
value of the coefficients lay between -0,063 and -0,079, which implies a negative impact 
of the ONMS decisions on attendance between 1.600 and 1.900 units per match. This 
result appears not too strong, but if evaluated from the perspective of a negative trend in 
attendance in the last three decades in Italian Serie A, shows a warning aspect that the 
sporting authorities should consider. 
It is obvious that the public order measures could not and should not be based on the 
attendance consequences following their decisions, but on the improvement associated to 
the safety of each single match played, inside and outside the stadium. We do not dwell on 
this point, but only to signal the inconsistency positions expressed by Minister of the 
Interior and by Public Order Research Centre.
13 It is important to notice that, even the 
public order authorities strategies, targeted to preserve the sports events safety, should 
keep a medium-long intertemporal profile, the aim of substituting the committed fans and 
their violent or irascible reactions to the match results, with the uncommitted fans, less 
interested in sport results and more in match quality, is far to be realized. The fidelity fan 
card strategy seems, at the moment, inadequate to reach the goal. This is true for the Serie 
A context, as suggested by our econometric investigation, but even more for the other 
lower divisions too since the attendance «exodus» in these categories doesn’t fall behind 
and human and financial resources are not consistent with the public order needs for 
fighting soccer violence. 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Allarme violenza negli stadi: incidenti cresciuti del 20%, in Corriere.it, 9
th August 2010.    13
5. Conclusion 
  
In this paper we tried to make clear on the introduction of the fidelity fan card as a policy 
measure able in reducing the soccer violence in the Italian context. Data on 420 matches 
played among 15 teams that disputed the Serie A championships from 2007 to 2010 have 
been collected in order to identify the variables influencing the attendance at single match 
level. Far from jurisdictional perspectives, we concentrated our attention on the 
relationships between stadium attendance and admittance restriction decisions introduced 
by CASMS and ONMS in regards to that part of visiting team fans not equipped with 
fidelity fan card, together with some admittance facilities for categories previously 
discouraged by the presence of soccer violence, like women and families. 
Our estimation does not support the hypothesis of a substitution effect between committed 
and uncommitted fans following the CASMS and ONMS decisions; these measures, like 
fidelity fan card obligation, influenced negatively the attendance. From our analysis the 
reduction can be quantified, in absolute value, between 1.600 and 1.900 units. At the same 
time the fidelity fan card experiment could not be defined a failure if evaluated from a 
public order perspective rather than the attendance viewpoint. A question arises: how the 
two perceptions could be considered separately? We answer if it is possible to attract into 
football live environment the uncommitted fans simply by excluding the committed part 
since the latter is a crucial part of the event. The exclusion of the committed part of the 
attendance would have a strong negative impact not only on box revenues, but also on the 
folklore associated to the match of which football events can never do without. 
   14
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